System calls are at an appropriate level of granularity for detecting malicious behavior. 1, 2 This article presents our preliminary work in analyzing system call traces, particularly their structure during normal and anomalous behavior. This work follows up on the anomaly detection methods developed by Stephanie Forrest and her colleagues 1 and provides a partial explanation as to why those techniques work and possible extensions.
TRACING SYSTEM CALLS
The audit trail we used consists of traces of system calls executed by privileged processes such as sendmail, ftpd, and lpr. Figure 1 shows a sample sendmail trace. The parameters for each system call are ignored and the name of the call is replaced with a unique number from the syscall.h file, reducing the trace to a sequence of numbers. From this sequence, we build a database of normal behavior for each process representing its normal or expected behavior. For each type of system call in the trace, the database records all system calls that can occur immediately after it, all calls that occur two calls after it, and so on up to the window size, one of the parameters for this method. Once we have created this normal database, we can use it to monitor running processes and flag anomalies when system calls occur in abnormal positions. More details about this approach are available elsewhere. 1 We began with two questions: where do anomalies occur in a system call trace, and what is the rate at which they are detected over time during intrusions? That is, we were interested in the locality of anomalies within system call traces generated during intrusions.
LOCALITY OF MISMATCHES
In Forrest et al., 1 two methods were used to quantify how many mismatches, or system calls in anomalous positions, occur in the trace relative to the normal database. Their first method sums up the total number of mismatches over the length of the trace. The second computes the maximum number of mismatches that the traces could have generated and expresses the actual number of mismatches as a percentage of that maximum.
Using total mismatch percentages may not work in general, because the traces could be of arbitrary length. A sufficiently long trace could result in a negligible mismatch percentage. What we need is a local measure that can indicate how many mismatches are in a specific part of the trace. Such a measure is also important if we want to do online detection, because it limits the amount of information we have to retain.
As a preliminary to developing an appropriate measure, we observed the temporal distribution of mismatches generated by different traces. Figure 2a gives an example of the mismatch distribution for sendmail traced during an intrusion via a syslogd vulnerability. 3, 4 The mismatches occur in fairly distinct bursts. Such temporal clumping is a feature not only of this particular anomaly, but of all the anomalies we observed.
The measure we developed was to count the mismatches within small, fixed-length sections of the trace, which we call locality frames. These frames are quite distinct from the windows that we use to look for anomalous system calls. We slide a frame of a given size-say 20 system calls-over the trace, one system call at a time. We start the frame at the beginning of the trace, so that the rightmost position of the frame is over the first system call. In each position of the frame, we count the number of system calls that generated a mismatch.
For example, consider the case where we have a pattern of mismatches from a given trace, 00111001…, where "0" indicates a system call that did not generate a mismatch and "1" corresponds to a call that did. Then, with a locality frame of size 5, we would consider frames containing ####0, ###00, ##001, #0011, 00111, and so on, where # indicates a frame location that does not contain a system call. Thus we would get a sequence of locality frame mismatches of 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3…. This sequence of mismatches can be plotted as a histogram. Figure 2b shows a histogram of the locality frame mismatches in the sendmail trace, for a locality frame of size 20. This plot indicates that the mismatches are clumped; the distribution of mismatches is characterized by distinct spikes. We regard this as promising, because it indicates that mismatches occur close together, and lets us define a local detection method. For instance, we could define a detection threshold for a given locality frame size; if the number of mismatches exceeds the threshold, we would trigger an alarm, or take some otherwise appropriate action. This kind of measure could allow us to have a lightweight detection scheme where the only tracing required is of system calls made by the process of interest, excluding the parameters to the calls. Further, we would only need to store short frames of calls, which we could check rapidly with little overhead.
How could an intruder evade this localized detection scheme? Two possibilities are as follows:
♦ The intruder could make sure that the system call sequences that are executed by the process are not anomalous in any way. This may be hard to achieve in practice, and would require exact knowledge of what the normal profile looks like; such knowledge may not be available to an intruder. Further, the profiles are likely to vary for different software and hardware configurations.
♦ The intruder could make sure the anomalous calls are spaced widely enough so that they never exceed the threshold in any given locality frame. To do so would require padding the trace with normal sequences of system calls, so that mismatches are not clumped.
MACROS TO DO THE WORK
Once we determined that the mismatches were occurring in a localized area of the intrusion trace, the next step was to study the structure of the normal traces and determine whether (and how) this structure is violated during an intrusion. There are various ways to learn a program's structure, including neural nets and other inductive techniques. However, in examining the traces of normal sendmail (the normal trace), we noted that long sequences of system calls were consistently repeated and that a deterministic finite automaton (DFA), and its equivalent language, appeared to be an appropriate description for the patterns. (We interchangeably refer to the DFA and its corresponding regular language.) We constructed the DFA using macros, which are variable-length patterns of system calls.
There were two types of sendmail traces: one where sendmail was used as a daemon, and another where it was used 3 8
S E P T E M B E R / O C T O B E R 1 9 9 7
3739: 7 5 69 69 7 141 69 8 26 48 7 30 69 8 7 5 69 69 8 7 5 69 69 8 8 88 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 as a client. The results reported here are for the sendmail client; the trace of the daemon yielded similar results. We produced macros from the client trace in three stages. 1. A single execution of a given program could consist of one or more processes; for example, sendmail forks off new processes to handle newly received messages. We separated the trace of system calls for a given program into individual ordered lists for each process. Figure 3 shows three processes from an execution of sendmail, representative of the three processes generated for each message sent. The process identification numbers are listed first, followed by the system call numbers for the given process in the order in which they were executed. (The processes correspond to the sample trace given in Figure 1 . In particular, process 3740 occurs in its entirety in both figures.) 2. To automatically reduce the size of the traces, we used scripts that preprocessed the data into a convenient form for manipulation, detected repeated patterns, and allowed us to extract common prefixes. In the case of sendmail, preprocessing reduced a trace of 97.4 Mbytes to 17.0 Mbytes.
3. We heuristically built a compact set of macros and a DFA by using additional scripts to further manipulate the sequences and by manually selecting macros. We used this approach because it is difficult (and computationally complex) to generate an optimal description of the traces. For that matter, it was unclear what notion of optimality would be useful for our purposes. Later we discuss some possible definitions of optimality and corresponding algorithms. The method reported here appears to achieve satisfactory results and is computationally viable.
To build the macros, we first separated the traces into three categories, corresponding to the three types of processes generated by sendmail. Examples of each type are shown in Figure 3 . Next, we divided each process into three parts: a prefix, a main portion, and a suffix. For each of the categories we found the longest common prefixes and suffixes. Then we looked for frequently occurring strings-repeated system calls and common short patterns of two to six system calls-in the main body of each process. Finally, we iteratively formed these strings of system calls (corresponding to numbers and previously defined macros) into macros (represented by letters). A complete list of macros for the normal trace of the sendmail client is given in Figure 4 .
When we applied the full list of macros to the sendmail normal trace, only 26 distinct process descriptions remained out of an original 147 processes.
These processes are listed in Figure 5 . Macros that occurred only a single time are represented as double letters.
Some of the strings in Figure 5 reduce to the same string if we use Kleene closure, defined as follows: Given a string x, the Kleene closure of x, x*, would represent the set of strings consisting of zero or more x's. For example, the 13 E's in process 3785 and the 29 E's in process 4796 would both reduce to E*, giving us the same string. However, this generalization would not preserve an exact description of the normal trace because it would describe a superset of possible traces. Thus, there is a trade-off between the number of macros, the 
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When identical processes occur, only the first instance is listed. The leading number indicates the process number, single numbers indicate system calls that were not incorporated into a macro, single letters indicate macros, and double letters indicate unique sequences of system calls and macros that occurred only within a single process.
length of the string each macro stands for, the lengths of the process descriptions, and how accurately the actual traces are represented. Figure 6 shows a representative DFA for the traces of the sendmail client using Kleene closure. A variety of DFAs are of course possible. When it came to the syslog intrusion, there were six processes; each differed from the macros derived from the normal database in at least one way. This result is not surprising because the derived macros defined the possible sequences of system calls more strictly than the original method, and the original method had found at least one anomaly in each process. 1 In the case of lpr, we arrive at similar results. We collected data over two weeks from 77 different machines at MIT's AI Lab, resulting in 2,766 traces of lpr's normal behavior (compared to 147 traces for sendmail). In the case of lpr, each trace consisted of a single process. By applying our scripts and macro generation technique, we were able to reduce the traces to 75 strings using only 36 macros (and Kleene closure). As before, there was a trade-off between the number of macros and the number of strings, so the number of strings and their length could have been further reduced if we used more macros.
We further discovered that the prefixes of lpr's traces were highly regular, as shown in Figure 7 . Suffixes were also generally regular, although there was more variation. Regularity in lpr and sendmail leads us to believe that such information about programs and their processes can be exploited for detecting intrusions. Each of these programs generates a fixed number of processes for each event. Further, each process consists of a sequence of highly regular events.
DISCUSSION
Our examination of normal process behavior revealed the existence of a regular structure. The major issue was how we could describe this regular structure in a useful manner. For instance, Forrest and colleagues 1 showed that looking at short sequences of system calls was an effective method for identifying an intrusion. Even though their method could identify as normal strings that sendmail would not normally generate, it still detected anomalies successfully. Thus a reasonably close approximation of normal behavior is sufficient.
We currently create the DFA heuristically using scripts and by hand, though we are looking at algorithms to further automate DFA generation. Using such algorithms raises the issue of efficiency as well as the problem of choosing a metric to assess the quality of the macros generated. An exact DFA representation of a program is likely to be problematic. First, we would have to encode every possible ordering of system calls, leading to a potentially huge DFA; for example, if a short sequence of system calls were repeated a large number of times, each call would have to be included in the DFA. Second, an exact representation would likely give false negatives if the trace length is a function of the data that the program is processing. Should we miss a possible variation in the size of the data we are dealing with, a false alarm would occur.
Another issue we face is that calculating macros based on the minimal description of the normal trace is likely to be time consuming and, depending on the definition of minimality used, potentially NP-hard. Also, some definitions of minimality may be useless, such as generating a minimal DFA in the number of its states. (Such a DFA would have a start state and an end state. There would then be an arc for every possible trace of system calls.) However, a minimum (or even minimal) description is unlikely to be necessary because, in most cases, it would be acceptable to have a sufficiently small set of macros, even if that set is not minimal. By heuristically generating the macros, we hope to preserve tractability in the algorithm's operation. Once a description has been generated, tracing a system's operation and determining if the trace complies with the description may be fast enough for an online system. 
B
y monitoring large, fixed sequences of system calls corresponding to macros, we believe that we can make it more difficult for intruders to avoid detection. Instead of having to only generate locally correct sequences of system calls, intruders would have to generate subsequences of system calls that correspond exactly to those of a macro. In addition to being constrained by the ordering of individual system calls, intrusions would have to consist of large, fixed blocks of system calls. Thus, to go undetected, an intrusion would have to mimic exactly both the macros and their ordering. Even if the functionality for an intrusion is available, the intrusion's duration (in the number of system calls to be executed) would likely be increased and thus improve the chances of detection by other means. Further, because the DFA is created heuristically in a nondeterministic fashion, it is possible to create a variety of different DFAs from the same normal data. Thus, the macros and the DFA for the same process could differ from computer to computer. Consequently, an intrusion that could be masked on one computer might be detected on another.
We are currently investigating if similar results, demonstrating the regularity of process system call traces, can be achieved using other versions of sendmail and whether processes other than sendmail and lpr have similar properties. Preliminary work on tracing the normal behavior of ftpd indicates similar levels of regularity, although the types of regularity differ. In the case of ftpd, processes contain multiple iterations of patterns that themselves have prefixes, bodies, and suffixes. We would also eventually like to design a system that could automatically collect traces for a given period of time, generate a suitable description of normal behavior such as the one we described, and use it to monitor for intrusions. The analysis presented here has provided a first-order explanation of why intrusions can be detected by examining system call traces. Features of these traces further suggest that they can be used to devise methods for detecting other types of anomolous or, for that matter, unusual behavior. We also hope it will inspire new techniques in the intrusion-detection arms race. x Intrusion detection techniques can be categorized into two classes.
Anomaly intrusion detection techniques have a description of normal or expected behavior and scan audit trails for deviations from it. Anomaly intrusion detection has been applied to several types of audit trails, including user behavior, privileged process behavior, and network traffic. User behavior has been profiled with statistical methods, 1 inductive pattern generation, 2 unsupervised tree learning, 3 and neural nets.
